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IS GOD VIOLENT?
On Violence and Religion
At the present time religion is often seen in connection with violence. 
Feminist theology has, however, alerted us for decades to the patriarchal 
concept of God with its corresponding effect of oppressing women. 
Environmental ethics has pointed to the theological roots of human violence 
against nature. Now postmodernism is showing the connection between 
religion and violence. Derrida speaks of God as war. In politics the theme of 
violence and religion is high on the agenda. In India Hindutva, Hindu 
nationalism, has left in its wake, through clashes with Moslems, a great 
many victims. Primarily because of Moslem extremists the topic of violence 
and religion has become a topic of discussion worldwide. These extremists
commit terrorist acts on the basis of the holy war that they themselves want. 
Christianity has also been violent in the course of history. It gave, when it 
became the state religion in the fourth century, religious legitimation to the 
power of the king and emperor. In Christian iconography the original 
depiction of Christ as shepherd changed into Christ the imperator.1 The 
cross functioned as the ruler’s scepter and Christ as the president of the 
Roman senate or as the cosmic Christ, enthroned above the world. 2 For 
Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1646) religious wars were the occasion for 
attempting to achieve peace among the nations by means of natural religion 
rather than the violent positive religions (Catholicism and Protestantism). 
Missions were also often violent in their interaction with existing 
civilizations.
I will investigate the question of whether God is violent with a view to 
the question of the extent to which God can be used as a justification of acts 
of destructive violence. I limit myself here to the Christian tradition. The 
question of whether God is violent can be answered in at least two ways. The 
first answers in the affirmative: God is violent. Nonetheless, different 
conclusions can be drawn from this, as we will see in our discussion of Mary 
Daly and Paul Tillich. The other position holds that God is not violent---not 
even constructively so. This position is defended by, for example, René 
Girard, F.O van Gennep, André Lascaris and Richard Kearney. We will 
analyze both positions for an answer to the question of whether God is 
violent and whether destructive violence can find its justification in God.
What is Violence and Power?
                                      
1 Compare the mural “The Good Shepherd” at the beginning of the third century in Rome 
with the mosaic “Christ as the Good Shepherd among the Sheep” in the second quarter of 
the fifth century in Ravenna, the Mausoleum van Galla Placidia. Schmidt 117, 134f. 
2 “Christ amid the Apostles,” apse mosaic of the mid-fifth century, Milan, San Lorenzo 
Maggiore. Cf. Schmidt 127. 
2We should first give a more precise definition of violence. The terms “power” 
and “violence” are closely connected but need to be distinguished from each 
other. “Power” is the ability to do something. Power has a physical side as 
well as a social side. We see something through with “might and main.” In 
the social sense power has to do with dominion over persons and groups. In 
that sense power, according to Hannah Arendt, is connected with the group, 
with the ability to act together. In the exercise of power one is dependent a 
group through whom one is given power. If the group disappears, the 
legitimation for that power also disappears.3 Power thus presupposes 
empowerment. In addition to empowerment, power also presupposes force in 
connection with the exercise of power. There can be no exercise of power 
without force, sanctions or penalties. The German language uses the term 
Gewalt in the sense of the exercise of power. I call that constructive violence. 
At the same time Gewalt can mean violence as the misuse of power. To do 
violence to (Gewalt antun) a girl is to rape her. That is destructive violence. 
Violence in this way covers a range of acts: violence in police actions by the 
United Nations in which the goal is to achieve peace and in which violence 
needs to be used proportionally is of a different order than the violence of 
criminals or terrorists in which the end justifies the means and the means 
are used arbitrarily. The former concerns force on the basis of a legitimate 
exercise of power, whereas the latter is a misuse of power, a disproportionate 
use of violence that is inhuman because of the destructive effect of the 
means. Borderline cases can be disputed. Police actions by the United 
Nations can deteriorate into disproportionate violence whereby the 
distinction between constructive violence inherent in the exercise of power 
and destructive violence as the consequence of the misuse of power becomes 
blurred. That does not detract from the fact that the distinction between
constructive and destructive violence is very useful in general. In the latter 
violence is unmistakably an evil, a malevolent act. The oppression of women 
justified by a patriarchal biblical concept of God, violence through religious 
wars, violence as a result of Hindu nationalism and the terrorist violence of 
religious extremists fall unmistakably under destructive violence and are to 
be called evil. 
Can the use of the God of Jesus Christ as a legitimation for acts of 
(the) oppression (of women) or of destructive violence in general be 
theologically justified? One could say yes if God himself is violent in a 
destructive way and people find in that a reason for acting in a similar way. 
Is God violent in the sense of destructive violence?
God as War
By way of introduction to the first position, which holds that God is violent, I 
will discuss Derrida’s speaking of the (metaphysical) God as war. I will 
examine of whether Derrida is of help with respect to our topic. In his 
Violence and Metaphysics, Derrida takes up the question of whether 
relationships can conceived of without violence. Here the term violence is 
used in a pre-ethical, transcendental sense. In my relationship with the 
other, in the appearance of the other to me, respect for the other cannot 
                                      
3 Arendt (1970) 44. 
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other.The inaccessibility of the other as inaccessibility must be disclosed
Each encounter with the other is necessarily supported by an “I am.” 
Respect for the being other of the other does not detract from the fact that 
the encounter with the other has the form of a phenomenon and occurs in 
my subjective consciousness. That is necessary violence and no encounter 
with the other can avoid it. Derrida calls the necessity that the other 
becomes an intentional phenomenon of my consciousness transcendental
violence. It is violence because the other as that which cannot be represented 
is presented by me. It is transcendental, non-ethical violence because it 
determines the condition of possibility for the encounter with the other.4
Here we see how terms like violence and war are viewed pre-ethically. 
War here is of the same origin as phenomenality. All (linguistic) forms of 
meaning have in a certain sense a violent character, by which is meant that 
they undergo the violence of the disturbing influence of the other who
intrudes from outside. ‘War …is congenital to phenomenality, is the very 
emergence of speech and of appearing.’5 ‘Violence appears with articulation.’
6 This analysis precedes our relationship with the other on an ethical level. It 
allows one to see clearly that ethical violence against the other entails a 
‘reduction of the other to a real moment of my life, …on the contrary, to gain 
access to the egoity of the alter ego as if to its alterity itself is the most 
peaceful gesture possible.’7
Derrida relates God to transcendental violence: God as a designation 
for war and violence. According to many western metaphysians since 
Parmenides, thinking and being are one. The metaphysical God is associated 
with this age of logocentrism and is, as absolute logos, its crown. It is in that 
way that Derrida sees God functioning as the guarantee of all 
understanding. Meanings derive their foundation in God as logos. As an 
alternative to this logocentrism Derrida proposes in Violence and Metafysics
thinking of God as Difference. The Other never coincides completely with its 
appearance or with my experience. The “difference” between them cannot be 
bridged. Talk about God stops at the border between our language and that 
which is beyond our language. Language refers to something outside of itself 
to which it cannot refer directly but which it invokes indirectly precisely in 
the act of referring. The difference between language and its “outside,” the 
position between the signs and that to which the signs refer is, according to 
Derrida, “God.” 8 That entails that speaking about a revelation of God is, in 
fact, impossible, for then God is subjected to the violence of language. For 
Derrida God is in fact inexpressible and unnamable. What do we do then 
with the God who, according to the witness of the Old and New Testament, 
has revealed himself? According to Derrida, this witness is always subject to 
the violence of language and contextuality. Therefore Derrida’s alternative, 
God as Difference (a God without revelation) is of little help with respect to 
                                      
4 Derrida (1978) 125.
5 Derrida (1978) 129. 
6 Derrida (1978) 147f.
7 Derrida (1978) 128.
8 Sneller (2003) 154.
4the question of whether the biblical God is violent and whether people can 
find an excuse for their violent acts in God.
God is Violent (But Has Conquered It)
Is the biblical God violent? The feminist theologian Mary Daly says yes: ‘If 
God is male, then the male is God.’ With this statement she wishes to 
unmask the patriarchal character of the Christian tradition of which the 
symbol is God the Father. She sees the images of God as “Supreme Being 
with a fixed plan” and as father as projections and justifications of the 
tyrannical father in a patriarchal society: ‘…Images of God as jealous and 
vengeful, which historian Arnold Toynbee has judged to have had a 
devastating effect upon Christian civilisation, may well be projections and 
justifications of the role of the tyrant father in patriarchal society.’9 By 
“patriarchal” Daly understands the male domination of women. She makes 
use in Beyond God the Father of Peter Berger’s The Sacred Canopy. Berger 
does a good job of pointing out how destructive violence could find its 
justification in God. Speaking of the role of the father Berger writes:
For example, the role of the father represents a wide variety of meanings ascribed to 
the institution of the family and, more generally, to the institutionalization of 
sexuality and interpersonal relationships. When this role is legitimated in mimetic 
terms---the father reiterating “here below” the actions of creation, sovereignty, or 
love that have their sacred prototypes “up above” then its representative character 
becomes vastly enhanced. Representation of human meanings becomes mimesis of 
divine mysteries. Sexual intercourse mimes the creation of the universe. Paternal 
authority mimes the authority of the gods, paternal solicitude the solicitude of the 
gods …The role of fatherhood confronts the individual as a divinely given facticity, 
ultimately untouchable ….10
Religion legitimizes human behaviour by connecting situations in society 
with the ultimate transcendent reality. The social order is presented as a 
reflection of ultimate reality. Thus the relation between religious language 
and reality appears to be less a matter of interaction than of a one-
sidedness. Language influences how we see things. If language about God is 
masculine, as Daly states, then she has found an explanation for the 
religious legitimation for the oppression of women. Purely masculine 
language for God and the image of God as the Supreme Power and as 
Supreme Being with a fixed plan confirm, according to her, reality, the 
patriarchal society. This has, as its converse, that power to name reality is 
taken away from women.
Daly agrees in Beyond God the Father with Tillich’s critique of theism 
that views God as a Supreme Being who has power over people and thus 
becomes a tyrant.11 She herself searches for the solution to the patriarchal
image of God in a new language through which women themselves name 
“themselves, the world and God.” Daly searches for her solution to the 
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but develops a language for women outside the Christian tradition. Tillich, 
as a Christian theologian, does provide the following alternative to the image 
of the patriarchal God who subjugates human beings:
Tillich views the relationship between God and the world 
pan(en)theistically. Even though God and the world are to be distinguished 
from each other because of God’s transcendence, that does not entail that 
God and the world are not closely related ontologically. God is everything; he 
can also be violent in a destructive way, even though, as Tillich claims, this 
destructive violence has been conquered. He appeals here to the Protestant 
mystic Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) who speaks of the “Abyss (Ungrund)” and 
to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) who assumes the 
existence of an unconscious principle in God. Schelling sees, on the hand, 
the dark principle in the ground of the divine, the principle of the will that is 
able to contradict itself. On the other hand, he sees the logos principle or the 
principle of light. In itself, the dark principle of the will could tear itself loose 
and act on its own, but this does not happen because the spiritual unity in 
the divine life holds the two principles together. Tillich speaks similarly of 
God when he points to a dialectical negativity in God. He writes: ‘… if there 
is no negative principle in addition to him which could account for evil and 
sin, how can one avoid positing a dialectical negativity in God himself?’12
God is not only the creator of life but also the destroyer. People can 
experience the element of the abyss in the threat of non-being. The positive 
side of the mystery is, however, dominant and reveals itself in the actual 
revelation of Christ as the power of the (new) being that conquers non-
being.13 God who has conquered destructive violence as evil in himself takes 
part through Christ in the human struggle against evil. 
According to Tillich, one can thus never use the biblical God as a 
justification of destructive violence. He is, after all, the God in whom violence 
has been conquered and who in Christ lets people participate in the new 
being. By assuming (conquered) evil in God, Tillich heads off the (in my view) 
unsatisfactory answer of, for example, John Hick to the problem of theodicy. 
How is one to reconcile the notion of an almighty and loving God to the 
(physical and moral) evil in the world? Hick holds that God creates people 
who can choose for him in freedom. Therefore, they cannot be created as 
perfect beings. In order to have a real choice between good and evil and to 
have a free relationship with God. God creates us, according to Hick,
spiritually and morally immature in a process of evolution in which evil is a 
challenge. God places us in a dangerous and ambiguous world in which we 
can develop into moral persons, so as to have a free relationship with God 
and in that way be on the road to the Kingdom of God.14 This Irenaean type 
of theodicy of the ‘free will defense’15 of human beings and in connection 
with that wanting to make natural and moral evil understandable can never 
be an answer to the existential question posed by victims as to why they 
                                      
12 Tillich (1968) 1, 210.
13 Tillich (1968) 1, 122.
14 Hick (1981).
15 See for contrast and points of hidden agreement between the Augustian and the Irenaean 
type of theodicy: Hick 1974 262-266. 
6have been struck by evil. Tillich sees the relationship between God and evil 
in a different way, i.e. from the perspective of the struggle against it. He does 
not give any theoretical answer to the question of the why of evil but a 
speculative and ethical answer. Speculatively, Tillich holds that the struggle 
is already present in God but has been conquered. God has overcome the 
evil in himself but struggles continually against it in the unruly world of 
creation---as is evident in Christ’s power of the new being and the work of 
the Spirit.
Tillich’s model of conquered evil in God stands and falls with his 
Christian framework of interpretation. Wherever this framework is no longer 
valid, this model of God in which evil is postulated undergoes a change, 
resulting in a two-faced God. That is the case with respect to the 
philosophical God of Weischedel as the “Whence of radically doubtfull 
reality” (“Woher der Fraglichkeit”) in which God is a hovering between being 
and non-being, between meaning and meaninglessness.16 Thus this God is 
the “Whence” of the ambiguous world of humanity and nature without any 
prospects for overcoming destructive violence. In polytheistic traditions in 
which God and the world cohere closely, two-faced gods can be encountered. 
Such a two-faced God can be found, for example in Nietzsche’s Dionysus. 
Dionysus is a symbol of the eternal return and the god of wine who cuts the 
ripe fruit from the vine with his knife. He is the God of life and death, of the 
eternal building up and destroying being: “this my Dionysian world of 
eternally creating itself, of eternally destroying itself, this mystery-world of 
the double delight, this my “beyond good and evil ….”17 And can we not also 
mention here the Hindu goddess Kali? Kali is life that feeds itself with life.18
She is untamed sex and violence that holds the circle of existence together. 
There are different stories about her and the Indian culture has attempted to 
tame her by depicting her as the destroyer of demons and as a protective 
mother. Kali is also the goddess who requires human sacrifices.19 Joseph 
Campbell also pointed to the “monster God” who breaks with all “standards 
for harmony, order and ethical conduct.”20 With this we encounter what 
René Girard has called the holy violence of religion.
If evil is traced back to God, that does necessarily mean that adherents 
of a faith that worships a violent God will also act violently. That is not the 
case with Weischedel’s concept of God as the “Whence” of radically doubtful 
reality.21 No more is it the case with those who worship Kali. The latter 
believe that it is precisely her destructiveness that protects them from 
threats to their existence. In the Christian tradition this is different because 
of the theme of imitation. If the biblical God is viewed as violent, as Daly 
shows, then his (male) imitators act that way as well. Something similar can 
be seen in Dionysus whom Nietzsche also claimed that he was to be 
imitated. Dionysus brings human beings to a realization of his contradictory 
                                      
16 Weischedel (1972) II, Book 5 ch. 1.
17 “diese meine dionysische Welt des Ewig-sich-selber-Schaffens, des Ewig-sich-selber-
Zerstörens, diese Geheimnis-welt der doppelte Wollüste, dies mein ‘Jenseits von Gut und 
Böse’ ….” Nietzsche (1973) 917.
18 Mohanti (2004) 137.
19 Mohanti (2004) 41.
20 Campbell (1988) 22.
21 Weischedel (1977).
7complexity and makes him “stronger, angrier and more intense ... than he 
is.”22
In brief, the position that God/gods and goddesses is/are violent can 
be explained differently. Daly wants to unmask God the Father of the 
Christian tradition as violent and his (male) imitators act that way as well. 
Tillich holds that there is evil in God but corrects the theistic concept of God 
by proposing that God has conquered the violence within himself. In the 
philosophical tradition of Nietzsche and Weischedel the tracing of evil to God 
leads to a two-faced God. Nietzsche’s Dionysus is just as violent as the 
Hindu goddess Kali. If we trace violence as evil to God, then religion
sometimes acquires violent characteristics. Is the opposite position, which 
claims that God (and thus religion) is not violent, not more convincing?
There Is No Violence in God       
The weakness of Tillich’s view of God and evil is that he, by means of a 
speculative theory of God’s being, wants to provide insight into the 
relationship between God and evil. The strength of Girard’s theory is that it 
does not deal in speculation about the being of God. Girard approaches the 
problem of violence and evil by interpreting sacred and other texts on 
violence as a scholar of literature and as an anthropologist. He maintains 
that in the Jewish and Christian texts a radical opposition between God and 
evil, the satan, arises.23 He shows how both traditions have broken with the 
traditional religion that strove for peace by bridling social violence via sacred 
violence. In his anthropological analyses Girard exposes the origin of 
violence by pointing to the mimetic relationships between people, how people 
imitate one another. He shows how traditional religion managed to bridle 
violence through violence that was ritually limited, i.e. through the 
scapegoat.24
Girard explains it as follows. People cannot live with increasing 
violence and this violence must therefore, if a social crisis arises, be 
channeled. Therefore a solution is sought through attributing guilt and thus
the cause of the violence to someone who is considered guilty of the crisis. 
He is killed as the scapegoat; he is sacrificed. Because of this “constructive” 
violence against one, the victim, peace returns. In Greek “scapegoat” means
“he who wards off plagues” and in Hebrew “destined for Azazel,” the demon 
of the desert (Lev. 16:21f.).25 At the same time the sacrificed scapegoat 
becomes a sacral being who is venerated. In this context arise prohibitions 
and taboos to regulate violence.26 Girard supports this theory with many 
examples of the “scapegoat” from Greek and other myths and from Western 
literature. He also investigates how the scapegoat continues to exist when 
the traditional religion has disappeared. In this way he analyzes the so-
called “texts of persecution” from European history.27
                                      
22 Nietzsche, par. 295.
23 Girard (2003) 162, 416-431.  
24 Girard, (2005)  81v., 84, 86v., 101, 104, 115, 267, 289-291; Girard (2003) Book 1 ch. 1;  
Girard (1982).
25 Girard (2003) 131.
26 Girard (2003) Book 1 ch.1. 
27 Girard (2003) 1 ch. 5; Girard (1982) chs. 1 en 2.    
8Girard is concerned with showing the change in Jewish and Christian 
texts, in which sacral violence is abandoned and therewith the violent God. 
There is opposition between Job’s friends, with their God of the persecutors, 
the God of violence, and Job himself who gradually sees that God stands on 
the side of the victims and appeals to God as witness to his innocence: My 
Redeemer lives (Job 19: 25-27).
Any society in which the scapegoat resumes his immemorial role of founder and 
restorer of transcendence is totalitarian; but biblical and Christian knowledge has 
brought an awareness of the implications of the scapegoat that makes impossible the 
revival of the illusion of Job’s friends, and of all those who believe they live in a 
flawless universe. The friends naively describe a universe governed by infallible 
justice, a universe that is undoubtedly atrociously cruel. Even without a lapse into 
neo-primitivism, we can admit that the unshakable conviction of those who inhabit 
such a world implies a kind of innocence and freshness lacking in the stifling 
totalitarian parodies of the modern world. 28   
Girard acknowledges that in the book Job the concepts of God held by his 
friends and the non-violent God of Job are still overlapping.29 This obtains 
also for other texts in the Old Testament, such as that of the suffering 
servant of the Lord.30 In the Gospels and especially in the story of Jesus’ 
suffering there is, however, a definite break with the notion of scapegoat. It is 
clear that the victim is not guilty. With that the notion of scapegoat loses its 
power of conviction. How can one knowingly continue to believe that it is a 
solution for the violence and unrest in society if the origin of the violence, the 
scapegoat, proves to be not guilty? According to Girard, one should therefore 
not read the story of Jesus’ suffering as a sacrifice.31 That is necessary 
because the story itself indicates that the scapegoat, Jesus Christ, is 
innocent. In that way it breaks with the demand for sacrifice, as if God could 
demand an act of violence, i.e. the sacrifice of Jesus, to achieve 
reconciliation. In the Gospel the notion of the scapegoat, the channeling of 
violence by sacral violence, is thus unmasked. If the scapegoat is discovered 
to be innocent, one can no longer shift the blame for a social crisis to a 
scapegoat. Thus the concept of a God who wants to be avenged on human 
beings shifts to a God who rejects violence: ‘The gospel text contains an 
explicit revelation of the foundations of all religions in victimage, and this 
revelation takes place thanks to a non-violent deity – The Father of Jesus 
….’32 For the idea of the non-violent God, Girard refers, for instance, to the 
ethics of the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5-7) and the parable of the 
tenants (Matthew 2133-43).33
This is the essential theme …of Jesus’ preaching: reconciliation with God can take 
place with unreservedly and with no sacrificial intermediary through the rules of 
the kingdom …. Mankind no longer has to base harmonious relationships on 
                                      
28 Girard (1987) 120f.    
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30 Girard (2003) 156f.
31 Girard (2003) 158-179; Book 2, ch. 2. 
32 Girard (2003) 184, 195.
33 Girard  (2003) 197, 178.
9bloodily sacrifices, ridiculous fables of a violent deity, and the whole range of 
mythological cultural formations.34
The alternative of a non-violent God entails an alternative non-violent 
lifestyle. The Dutch theologian Lascaris, influenced by Girard, gives a good 
example of this in his Het Soevereine Slachtoffer (The Sovereign Victim).
Girard himself points to Jesus’ preaching of the kingdom of God. The 
kingdom of God substitutes love for commandments and rituals which 
includes the whole range of rituals in the sacrificial religions. The message of 
the Kingdom of God is completely clear: ‘It is always a matter of bringing 
together the warring brothers, of putting an end to the mimetic crisis by a 
universal renunciation of violence.’35 We need to imitate God “who refrains 
from all forms of reprisal and makes his sun to shine upon the ‘just’ and the 
‘unjust’ without distinction.”36 If one wants to avoid violence, the alternative,
according to the Gospels, is to love one’s neighbour. If Jesus’ message of the 
Kingdom of God had been accepted, there would, according to Girard, have 
been no cross and the Apocalypse would not have been proclaimed.37
This position claims undeniably that God is not violent and rejects 
every violent religion. What I miss in this position is a closer definition of 
God’s power. The Christian tradition speaks of God’s omnipotence, a term 
that is vulnerable to misunderstanding. Is an abstract view of omnipotence 
as “able to do everything that is logically possible” not also the reason why 
the classical theodicy is questionable? How is a loving, almighty person who 
is “able to do everything” to be reconciled with evil in the world? This 
formulation of the problem arises from the abstract concept of omnipotence. 
Daly pointed above to the patriarchal, dictatorial concept of God. The 
concept “power” has a negative connotation for many and is even a dirty 
word. If people like Girard and others, such as Lascaris and Van Gennep, 
claim that God is non-violent, does this also entail that the only power God 
has is the power of love, the power of the suffering God?
In short, if we want to prevent religion from becoming violent, then this 
view will help greatly. However, it is not clear how we should understand 
God’s power. Power presupposes force, constructive violence so as to 
maintain order. God is not violent in a destructive way and this position 
therefore differs from the former on this point. But should we also say that 
God is not violent in a constructive way, because the power of God is only 
the power of the suffering God?  
Is God Non-Violent?
My critique of the first position---that God is violent (but has overcome it)---
is that it traces evil back to God. Depending on the religious framework of 
interpretation, this can lead to a two-faced God. With the exception of Tillich 
this position holds that God is violent in the destructive sense. My critique of
the second position---that God is non-violent---is that the rejection of 
violence in God leaves us with the problem of how to understand God’s 
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power. I will defend the view that God is non-violent but that this does not 
exclude God’s power. Given that power entails force and even constructive 
violence, I understand the proposition that God is non-violent in the sense 
that God is not destructively violent. I will first take up a closer definition of 
God’s power and finally will remark on the uniqueness of God-talk when we 
are talking about God as powerful, as father and as lord.
Of those who hold that God is entirely non-violent, Van Gennep 
especially has expressed himself most explicitly on God’s power. He 
distinguishes between the power of the word and the power over the powers. 
He emphasizes solely the first: the power of the biblical God who allows all
the room possible to the free decisions of human beings and respects human 
freedom. It is the power of the suffering God who is powerful in a defenseless 
way. In the determination of this power Van Gennep is guided by Hannah 
Arendt’s insight “that the communicative structure of power is its 
foundation. For that reason true power is power through the word.”38 Power 
needs empowerment by people. For that reason we speak here of the 
communicative structure of power. If Van Gennep views God’s power as 
restricted to the power of the word that allows room for human freedom, is 
that not a power that, in fact, is not power at all? Sölle has been consistent 
in rejecting the term “power” with respect to God: for her God loses himself 
in love. Van Gennep uses the word “power” and calls God’s love 
(defenselessness) powerful.39 With this the word “power” is viewed in a very 
different way from that which we usually understand by power. It is the 
power of love that comes to expression in Jesus Christ---a power of love that, 
according to Van Gennep, will prevail ultimately precisely because of its 
defenselessness. Meerten ter Borg wonders correctly why the term power is 
used here.40 The term lacks any relationship to what people usually 
understand by power.
However important the power of the word is, that does not affect the 
fact that the Bible also speaks of God’s power over the powers, as in the 
Exodus from Egypt, in the resurrection of Jesus Christ and it is power over 
the powers that emerges in the book of Revelation. The power of the word, 
the power of the suffering God, places all emphasis on God’s 
defenselessness. This defenselessness is already present at the time of 
creation when God withdraws through allowing a world to exist opposite to 
him. God’s plans with Israel fail without his, according to the Old Testament, 
wanting to have the power to force his partner to his will. Defenselessness is 
especially visible when Jesus refuses earthly power on his way to the cross. 
Defenselessness does not exclude, according to H. Berkhof, the active 
exercise of power in itself: ‘it does exclude a forcible exercise of power which 
wipes out the power of the opposite.’41 In addition to the power of the word, 
the power of love, there is also power over the powers. In Jesus’ life this 
power is also present in the force he used in healing the sick and in driving 
out demons.
                                      
38 Van Gennep (1985) 411.   
39 Van Gennep (1985) 376.
40 Ter Borg (1991) 86.
41 Berkhof (1979) 134.   
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If we see the two ways of power mentioned above as separate from 
each other, then they can conflict with each other. The one line speaks of the 
power of the word as the power of love as that comes to its deepest 
expression on the cross. The other line, God’s power over the powers, can be 
explained as the “power of dominance,” God as the dominant Other, the God 
of patriarchal culture, the combatant who punishes the godless with 
destruction and death. One can unite both lines with each other if we allow 
the latter to be stamped by the former. That happens in Berkhof’s 
description of God as the defenseless superior power.42 This term does 
justice to both poles of God’s being: his love and his power. God does 
withdraw in his defenselessness and allows human beings the space to act. 
But that is not the last word. The defenselessness is not an expression of 
lack of power but of superior power. “He can yield because he knows that he 
will win.”43 In this way we can acknowledge the second line of God’s power: 
power over the powers. The cross, the power of love visible in Christ’s 
suffering and in the co-suffering of the Father with the Son belongs together 
with the resurrection as the expression of God’s power over the powers. It is 
from this that Christians derive the hope that the superior power of his ‘love 
will melt away all resistance and will then be almighty, because then our 
God-given power will fully put itself into the service of this love.’44 It is clear 
her that one cannot use God as an justification of destructive violence and at 
the same time God is not powerless but continues to exercise his power in a 
loving way. 
The use of the term defenseless superior power as God’s power 
contradicts the view that God’s power is exercised only via people. Such a 
view emerges in Richard Kearney’s The God Who May Be. Kearny speaks of a 
powerless God and cites Etty van Hillesum, who wrote in a Nazi 
concentration camp: ‘You (God) cannot help us, but we must help you and 
defend Your dwelling place inside us to the last.’45 Kearny also emphasizes 
that God gives people power and puts them in positions to do good so as to 
help complete creation.
By choosing to be a player rather than an emperor of creation, God chooses 
powerlessness. This choice expresses itself as self-emptying, kenosis, letting go. God 
thus empowers our human powerlessness by giving away his power, by 
possibilizing us and our good actions – so that we may supplement and co-
accomplish creation.46
Here the term God becomes a designation for the power of people and God 
himself is powerless. It is forgotten how complex human history is with 
respect to power and that there are factors at play that far exceed human 
power. God’s power over the powers also entails that power is given to people 
but that does not say everything, given the complexity of human history, 
                                      
42 Berkhof (1979) 133ff.
43 Berkhof (1979) 138.
44 Berkhof (1979)139.
45 Hillesum (1996) 176.
46 Kearney (2001) 108.
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about the power above the powers.  I therefore choose to speak of God’s 
power as defenseless superior power.
In connection with this we should say something in conclusion about 
God-talk: How do we speak about God when we call him powerful, father or 
king?
Daly sees the language of God as father as influenced by patriarchal 
culture. The language of men creates the social order. God the father is then 
nothing more than a reflection of a hierarchical culture dominated by men. 
Ricoeur and McFague have pointed to the metaphorical character of the 
language about God as father and king, etc.47 Metaphorical language is 
characterized by “is” and “is not.” The biblical God does not thus coincide 
entirely with the patriarchal power of the world at the time. The same 
obtains for the parable as an extended metaphor. The father and the king in 
Jesus’ parables are corrections in fact of the traditional concepts of father 
and king because they depict ordinary fathers or kings. The limit expression 
of excess and exaggeration points to that: Which father accepts his son 
unconditionally and gives him a place of honour in his house like the father 
of the prodigal son does (Luke 15)? And which king cancels the large 
financial debt of his administrator (Matthew 18: 23-35)? To call God father 
or lord is not a matter of concepts but of schemas, in the way that Kant talks 
about schemas of a concept: procedures to create images for the Name. 
These schemas are also models, rules to give shape to the Divine.48 Speaking 
of God’s power is also metaphorical. Van Gennep here emphasizes entirely 
the “is not,” the lack of correspondence with what we usually see as power, 
whereas the “is,” the correspondence, has disappeared from view. In the 
term “defenseless superior power” the metaphorical speaking of God’s power 
emerges clearly, because it turns power and love into something new in our
world.
In brief, God is not violent in the sense of destructive violence. Every 
use of God for destructive violence is therefore to be rejected, even though 
such use has often been made in the Christian tradition. God’s power also 
implies power over the powers. Without this, Jesus’ resurrection is
unthinkable. The exercise of power entails constructive violence. Jesus’ 
resurrection as the victory over the power of death is an example of this. 
God’s defenseless superior power does not exclude constructive violence 
against the powers of evil. This power over the powers is the pole of God’s 
power in distinction from the other pole: God’s love. Both poles are present 
in Berkhof’s term God’s defenseless superior power. Christian ethics needs 
to elaborate on the violence between destructive and constructive violence. 
Can one appeal to God for justifying constructive violence? Given that people 
quickly misuse power, such an appeal should occur only in extreme 
circumstances such as tyranny. It is further a task of Christian ethics to 
provide orientation for acting from the perspective of God the liberator, the 
God of Jesus Christ.  
                                      
47 Ricoeur (1975); Ricoeur (1978); McFague (1983).   
48 Ricoeur (1995) 233.
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Summary 
This article deals with the question of whether God is violent with respect to 
the question how far God (of the Bible) can be held responsible for acts of 
destructive violence. There are at least two answers to this question. The one 
answers  ‘Yes’, God is violent, but different conclusions can be drawn from 
this, as can be seen in Daly and Tillich. The other position states that God is 
not violent (Lascaris, Girard, Van Gennep, Kearny). I take a third position. 
The conclusion is that the God of the Bible is not violent in the destructive 
sense. God’s power is also power over the powers. Without this Jesus’ 
resurrection is impossible. God’s defenseless superior power does not 
exclude constructive violence against the powers of evil. 
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